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JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction over this case is proper pursuant to Utah Const, art. VIII, §§3 and 5,
and Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-2-2(3)0), 78-2-2(4) and 78-2a-3(2)(j).
ISSUES AND STANDARDS
This appeal is from the district court's entry of summary judgment and from the
district court's dismissal of remaining claims for failure to prosecute.
Whether a party is entitled to summary judgment is a question of law, which is
reviewed for correctness. Mills v. Brodv, 929 P.2d 360, 362 (Utah App. 1996). Summary
judgment is appropriate when there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Stien v. Marriott Ownership Resorts, Inc., 944
P.2d 374, 377 (Utah App. 1997). In reviewing a summary judgment, the facts are viewed in
a light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Mills v. Brodv, 929 P.2d at 362.
The issues to be considered in determining whether the district court correctly
concluded that there were no genuine issues of material fact and that appellee Russell J.
Limb ("Limb") was entitled to judgment as a matter of law include the following: (1) Did
the Smiths' actions in their bankruptcy proceeding judicially estop the Smiths from
subsequently asserting a right to an equity of redemption in Limb's property; (2) Was Limb
on actual or constructive notice of the Smiths' claim to the title of his property; (3) Did the
post-default agreements alleged by the Smiths' abrogate their claim to an equitable mortgage
to Limb's property; and (4) Did the Smiths prior conduct bar their ability to seek equitable
redress for their alleged injuries?
1

Whether a district court properly dismissed an action for failure to prosecute is
reviewed for abuse of discretion. Charlie Brown Constr. Co. v. Leisure Sports, Inc., 740
P.2d 1368, 1370 (Ct. App.), cert, denied, 765 P.2d 1277 (Utah 1987). The district court
has broad discretion in dismissing actions for failure to prosecute, and the district court's
decision will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion and a likelihood that injustice has
occurred. Hartford Leasing Corp. v. State, 888 P.2d 694, 697 (Ct. App. 1994), cert.
denied, 899 P.2d 1231 (Utah 1995); Charlie Brown Constr. Co.. 740 P.2d at 1370.
Whether a district court properly ruled on a motion for relief from judgment under
Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure is reviewed for abuse of discretion. Birch
v. Birch, 771 P.2d 1114, 1117 (Utah App. 1989). The district court has broad discretion in
ruling on such motions. Id.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES. AND RULES
Utah Code Ann. § 57-3-3
Each document not recorded as provided in this title is void as against any
subsequent purchaser of the same real property, or any portion of it, if:
(1) the subsequent purchaser purchased the property in good faith and for a
valuable consideration; and
(2) the subsequent purchaser's document is first duly recorded.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Nature of the Case.
Appellant Penn H. Smith originally filed this action on October 8, 1992 seeking
damages against appellees Richard H. Tyler and Ina W. Tyler for breach of contract.
According to the original complaint, the Tylers failed to pay to Mr. Smith certain proceeds
2

from a real estate transaction that occurred on September 16, 1991 in which the Tylers sold
certain parcels of real estate located in Washington County, Utah to Limb. Some two years
later on June 29, 1994, Mr. Smith, along with Mary Anne Smith and EPS Development
(hereinafter collectively referred to as the "Smiths"), filed a Second Amended Complaint to
which Limb was joined as a defendant. In the Second Amended Complaint, the Smiths came
up with a new theory that certain absolute conveyances of the subject property to the Tylers,
the predecessors in title to Limb, were actually equitable mortgages and that, although Limb
is an innocent purchaser without any knowledge regarding the alleged equitable mortgages,
the properties remain subject to those mortgages.
Limb filed for and was granted summary judgment against the Smiths' claims of
equitable mortgage based on three grounds. First, that the Smiths were judicially estopped
from asserting an equity of redemption because of their specific disclaimer of any interest in
the subject properties in prior bankruptcy proceedings. Second, that the Smiths cannot
enforce an equity of redemption against Limb who was a bona fide purchaser for value from
the Tylers protected by the provisions of the Utah Recording Act. Third, even if the Smiths
held an equity of redemption, their alleged equitable mortgages were abrogated by specific
agreements between the Smiths and the Tylers.
After the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Limb, a remaining claim
between the Smiths and the Tylers languished for many months. During that period of time,
title to Limb's property remained encumbered by a lis pendens that had been recorded by
Smiths giving notice of the pendency of this action. Limb moved the court to dismiss the
3

action for failure to prosecute or alternatively to certify the summary judgment as a final
judgment pursuant to Rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. After conducting a
hearing, the trial court determined to dismiss the remaining claims in the case for lack of
prosecution and a final judgment was subsequently entered.
Smiths brought this appeal challenging (1) the trial court's grant of summary judgment
in favor of Limb, and (2) the trial court's dismissal of the remaining claims for lack of
prosecution.
B.

Course of Proceedings.
Limb filed his motion for summary judgment against appellants on March 7, 1995.

After the summary judgment motion was fully briefed and argued, Judge J. Philip Eves
issued a Memorandum Opinion and Order Granting Defendant Limb's Motion for Summary
Judgment on April 27, 1995. In that opinion, Judge Eves, after a careful review of the
evidence submitted by Limb, concluded that there were no genuine issues of material fact
and that Limb was entitled to summary judgment on the grounds of (1) judicial estoppel, (2)
the Utah Recording Act, and (3) abrogation of equitable mortgages. [R. 660-667.]l
Judge Eves also granted partial summary judgment in favor of the Tylers and in favor of
Security Title Company on a pending third-party complaint. After the summary judgments
were entered, all claims in the case were dismissed as against Limb, but certain claims
remained pending between the Smiths and the Tylers arising from or relating to certain water
rights claimed by the Smiths. As a result, there was no final appealable order and title to
l

A copy of Judge Eves' opinion is included in the appendix to this brief.
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Limb's property remained encumbered by the lis pendens recorded against the subject
property by the Smiths.
On July 18, 1996, Limb filed in the district court a motion to dismiss for lack of
prosecution or, alternatively, to certify partial summary judgment as final. That motion was
heard by Judge Eves and on December 23, 1996, Judge Eves entered a final judgment
incorporating the summary judgment rulings and dismissing all other claims. [R. 730.]2
On December 23, 1996, the Smiths filed a motion pursuant to Rule 60(b) of the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure to set aside the judgment. That motion came before the court on
February 10, 1997 and the Smiths failed to appear at the hearing either in person or by
counsel. Consequently, on March 10, 1997, Judge Eves entered an order denying the motion
to set aside the judgment. [R. 785.]
The Smiths filed their original notice of appeal on January 22, 1997. After the court
issued its order denying the Rule 60(b) motion, the Smiths filed an amended notice of appeal
on April 11, 1997.
C. Statement of Facts.
On or about November 10, 1987, the Tylers loaned to the Smiths the sum of $26,500
evidenced by a promissory note (the "First Loan"). [R. 543.] As security for the First
Loan, the Smiths agreed to deliver warranty deeds to the Tylers covering three parcels of
property located in Washington County described in the Second Amended Complaint as
parcels 1,2, and 3. [R. 544.] According to the agreement between the Smiths and Tylers,
2

A copy of the Final Judgment is included in the appendix to this brief.
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title to parcels 1,2, and 3 would belong absolutely to the Tylers if the Smiths failed to repay
the First Loan. Conversely, the Tylers agreed to deed parcels 1,2, and 3 back to the Smiths
if the First Loan was timely repaid. Id.
On or about November 4, 1988, the Smiths borrowed an additional $30,000 from the
Tylers pursuant to a promissory note (the "Second Loan"). Id. To secure the Second Loan,
the Smiths agreed to deliver a warranty deed conveying to the Tylers title to the property
described as parcel 4 in the second amended complaint. Id. According to the agreement
between the Smiths and Tylers, title to parcel 4 would belong absolutely to the Tylers if the
Smiths failed to repay the Second Loan. Conversely, the Tylers agreed to deed parcel 4
back to the Smiths if the Second Loan was timely repaid. [R. 494-95.]
In conjunction with the Second Loan, the Tylers agreed to extend the term of the First
Loan. A document entitled "Extension and Modification Agreement" containing legal
descriptions of parcels 1,2, and 3 was executed by the Smiths and recorded at the
Washington County Recorder's office on November 3, 1988. [R. 545.] The Extension and
Modification Agreement is the only recorded document the Smiths rely upon as providing
constructive notice that the absolute warranty deeds conveying to Tylers the title to parcels 1,
2, and 3 were intended to be conditional conveyances as security for the First Loan. No
document was recorded at the Washington County Recorder's office indicating that the
absolute warranty deed given to Tylers for parcel 4 was intended as a conditional conveyance
to secure repayment of the Second Loan. [R. 545.]
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Both the First Loan and the Second Loan went into default and the Smiths failed to
repay either loan. After the loans went into default, the Tylers sent numerous notices to the
Smiths advising them of the defaults and demanding payment. [R. 546.]
On or about November 13, 1989, the Smiths filed a voluntary petition for bankruptcy in
The United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Utah. As part of the debtors'
schedules filed by the Smiths in their bankruptcy case, the Smiths listed an interest in parcels
1,2, 3, and 4. [R. 546.]
On or about August 1, 1990, U.S. Bankruptcy Judge Judith A. Boulden entered an order
in the bankruptcy case approving a stipulation between the Smiths and the Tylers regarding
the disposition of parcels 1, 2, 3, and 4. The bankruptcy stipulation, as approved, provided
that parcels 1, 2, 3, and 4 were to be listed for sale and, if sold within 21 months of June
13, 1990, all proceeds were to be paid to the Tylers up to the amounts owed on the First
Loan and Second Loan and the balance was to be deposited with the bankruptcy court. If not
sold within the 21 month period, the Smiths were to withdraw all claims to the four parcels.
[R. 546-47.] Upon execution of that stipulation, the Smiths agreed they no longer had an
equity of redemption and that their bankruptcy estate would only have an interest in the
proceeds of a sale. [R. 666.]
On or about February 11, 1991, the Smiths wrote a letter to Duane H. Gillman, the
United States Bankruptcy Trustee, in which, after referring to the loans from the Tylers, the
Smiths stated:

7

We have been unable to repay the Tylers under the terms of the notes and
agreements and the properties rightfully belonged to the Tylers about a year befor
[sic] we filed our chapter 11.
At the time of filing our chapter 11 we had been in default for more than a year
and the properties rightfully belonged to the Tylers but upon the advice of our
lawyer, he included them in the bankruptcy. This should have never been done.
We now know that the advice we received from Mr. Petty to include theese [sic]
properties in our bankruptcy was bad advice for we really had no claim to them.
Please let this letter be our request to release the properties out of our bankruptcy.
[R. 547.] Along with the February 11, 1991 letter, the Smiths filed with the bankruptcy
court an ex parte motion to release real property in which they made the following
statements:
2. Upon the bad advice of previous counsel these four properties that were
deeded to the Tylers more than two years prior to the filing of the debtors' Petition
for Bankruptcy were included in the inventory of real property.
3. The debtor is fearful that because of bad legal advice the Tylers have been
damaged and should be granted the relief of regaining control of their property.
[R. 547-48.]
With respect to the letter and the motion filed with the bankruptcy court, appellant Penn
Smith testified at his deposition:
Q.
A.

And the reason you filed this document, again, was so that the
bankruptcy court would release the property from the bankruptcy to the
Tylers?
That's correct.

Q.
A.
Q.
A.

You wanted the property to be released from the bankruptcy That's correct.
— so Mr. Tyler could sell?
That's correct.

[R. 548.]
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After receiving the letter and ex parte motion to release real property, the bankruptcy
trustee, Mr. Duane Gillman, received a request for abandonment from Mr. and Mrs. Richard
H. Tyler requesting that the trustee abandon parcels 1, 2, 3, and 4. [R. 548.] After
reviewing the facts and circumstances and in reliance on the statements made in the February
11, 1992 letter as well as the ex parte motion to release real property filed by the Smiths,
Mr. Gillman signed a notice of abandonment in which he concluded:
Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 554, I have found the above listed property to not
belong to the debtor, not be part of the bankruptcy estate, therefore,
burdensome to the estate, and of inconsequential or no value to the estate. I
have given notice of my intent to abandon such property during the meeting of
creditors and there being no objection, or request for hearing, the Trustee
hereby abandons any interest that the estate may have in and to said property.
[R. 549.] The request for abandonment and notice of abandonment from the trustee were
recorded at the office of the Washington County Recorder on September 16, 1991 as Entry
No. 390753, in Book 618, at Page 719 in connection with the sale of the properties to Limb.
[R. 549.]
On or about August 19, 1991, the Tylers advised the Smiths that they had a potential
purchaser for the properties and that it would be easier to sell the properties if certain water
rights, then controlled by the Smiths, could be included as part of the sale. [R. 549.] The
Smiths specifically allege in their Second Amended Complaint that:
Under an agreement made at the meeting on August 19, Smiths agreed to
relinquish any claim to the subject real property, in order to facilitate the sale
of the property to Tylers' purchaser and Tylers agreed to pay Smiths the sum
of $40,000. Twenty Thousand Dollars of said sum was attributed to Smiths'
equity in the subject real property and $20,000 was attributed to Smiths'
agreement to transfer the above mentioned water rights.
9

[R. 549-50.] The Tylers did not dispute the Smiths' allegation that an agreement was made
on August 19, 1991 that the Tylers could sell the properties free from any claim of the
Smiths. The only dispute between the Smiths and Tylers was on what amount was agreed to
be paid by the Tylers to the Smiths. The Tylers claim that they agreed to pay the Smiths any
amounts received from the sale over the balance then due on the First Loan and Second
Loan. [R. 550.]
After receiving notice from the bankruptcy trustee that the properties did not belong
to the Smiths, the Tylers placed a sign on one of the parcels to advertise the properties for
sale. [R. 550.] The Tylers subsequently agreed to sell the properties to Limb for the sum of
$90,000. [R. 550.] The transaction whereby the Tylers sold the properties to Limb was
closed through Security Title Company in St. George, Utah on September 16, 1991 upon the
recordation of a warranty deed from the Tylers to Limb conveying title to the properties.
[R. 550-51.] The proceeds from the sale to Limb, after transaction costs, were insufficient
to cover the amounts that were owed on the First Loan and Second Loan. As a result, the
Tylers did not pay any overage to the Smiths. [R. 551.] At the time that Limb acquired title
to the properties, he had no knowledge that the Smiths had ever claimed any interest in title
to the properties. [R. 551.] The property consisted of vacant land on which there were
certain items of "junk" including "scrap steel and things of that nature." [R. 665.]
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The district court correctly concluded that any one of three rules of law barred the
Smiths' claim against Limb and, therefore, correctly entered summary judgment against the
10

Smiths and in favor of Limb. The Smiths' claim is barred on the basis of (i) judicial
estoppel, (ii) doctrine of bona fide purchasers under the Utah Recording Act, and (iii)
abrogation of equitable mortgages. Further, because summary judgment should be affirmed
on any legal basis available to the district court, even if not relied upon by the court in
granting summary judgment, the district court's entry of summary judgment should be
affirmed on the basis that the Smiths' inequitable conduct bars their claim for equitable
relief.
First, as to the judicial estoppel grounds, the Smiths' disclaimer of any interest in the
property during their bankruptcy proceeding estops them from now asserting a claim against
Limb's property.
Second, the Smiths' claim against Limb is barred on the basis that Limb is a bona
fide purchaser. The Smiths' do not allege any facts suggesting that Limb had actual
knowledge of the Smiths' interest in the disputed property. Furthermore, the facts alleged by
the Smiths regarding constructive notice ~ that there was some scrap steel on otherwise
vacant land — do not, as a matter of law, establish "open, visible, and exclusive" possession
that could give constructive notice of a claim against title.
Third, the Smiths' claim is barred because the Smiths themselves have alleged at least
two separate agreements that abrogated the claimed equitable mortgages. One such
agreement is a stipulation entered into by the Smiths and Tylers during the Smiths'
bankruptcy proceeding. This stipulation provided that the Smiths no longer had an equity of
redemption and that their bankruptcy estate merely had an interest in any excess proceeds
11

from the sale of the properties. A second agreement between the Smiths and Tylers
permitted the Tylers to sell the properties free of any claims by the Smiths. Both of these
agreements operate to abrogate the Smiths' Claim of an equitable mortgage.
Finally, general principles of equity bar the Smiths' attempt to resurrect their claim
for an equitable mortgage. It is well established that one who seeks equity must do equity.
In this case, the Smiths have failed to satisfy this equitable principle, because they disclaimed
aU of their interest in the property to the bankruptcy court. On the basis of their disclaimer,
the bankruptcy court released the property from their bankruptcy proceeding, thereby
removing it as an asset to satisfy their creditors. Now, years later and after an innocent
purchaser has bought the property, the Smiths seek to revive their claim for an equitable
mortgage. Under such circumstances, equity mandates that the Smiths' claim against Limb
be denied as a matter of law, because the Smiths have absolutely no equity vis a vis Limb.
As to the district court's dismissal of the Smiths' remaining claim and refusal to set
aside its order of dismissal, the record is replete with evidence supporting the district court's
determination that dismissal of the Smiths' remaining claim was warranted on the basis of
their failure to prosecute the claims. On this appeal, the Smiths have failed to demonstrate
that the district abused its discretion in dismissing their remaining claim and refusing to set
aside its order of dismissal. Indeed, the Smiths have completely failed to even brief the
district court's refusal to set aside its final order, which dismissed their remaining claim.
The dismissal and refusal to set aside should therefore be affirmed.

12

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY ENTERED
SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF LIMB
A. The Undisputed Facts Establish as a Matter of Law that the Smiths' Claim Against
Limb is Barred by Judicial Estoppel.
Under the Utah formulation of judicial estoppel, "TA1 person may not, to the prejudice
of another person deny any position taken in a prior judicial proceeding between the same
persons or their privies involving the same subject-matter, if such prior position was
successfully maintained.'" Stevensen v. Goodson. 924 P.2d 339, 353 (Utah 1996) (first
emphasis added) (quoting Salt Lake City v. Silver Fork Pipeline Corp., 913 P.2d 731, 734
(Utah 1995) (additional quotation omitted)). Utah courts have explained that the true
"purpose of judicial estoppel is . . . safeguarding the integrity of the judicial process from
conduct such as knowing misrepresentations or fraud on the court." Salt Lake City v. Silver
Fork Pipeline Corp.. 913 P.2d 731, 734 (Utah 1995); see also Jones. Waldo, Holbrook &
McDonough v. Dawson. 923 P.2d 1366, 1371 (Utah 1996).
The doctrine of judicial estoppel applies in this case to bar the Smiths' current assertion
that they maintain the equity of redemption in Limb's property. The Smiths do not dispute
that they filed a voluntary petition for bankruptcy in The United States Bankruptcy Court for
the District of Utah. [R. 922; 546, 597-98.] Initially, the Smiths listed an interest in the
properties as an asset in the schedules filed with the bankruptcy court. However, they
subsequently wrote a letter to the bankruptcy trustee in which they disavowed any interest in
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the properties. [R. 901.] The Smiths stated, "[W]e have no furthur [sic] claim upon these
properties." [R. 901.] The Smiths also stated that because they had been unable to repay
the Tylers, "the properties rightfully belonged to the Tylers about a year befor [sic] we filed
our chapter 11." [R. 901.]
Simultaneous with their transmittal of this letter disclaiming all interest in the properties,
the Smiths filed a motion with bankruptcy court to the same effect. [R. 902-03.] In this
motion, the Smiths explain that they had deeded the properties to the Tylers more than two
years prior to their filing of the bankruptcy petition. [R. 903.] Thus, the Smiths expressly
took the position in their bankruptcy case that they had no interest in the property, a position
at complete odds with the position they now assert. The district court found, and the Smiths
do not dispute, that the bankruptcy trustee relied upon the Smiths' statements by signing a
notice of abandonment, in which the trustee found and concluded that the Smiths had no
interest or claim to the properties. [R. 662.] Hence, the Smiths were successful in their
asserted position in the bankruptcy proceeding.
The district court also found that the Tylers relied on the position taken by the Smiths
relinquishing all claims to the properties. [R. 662-63.] This reliance is evidenced in part by
the fact that the Tylers sold the properties to Limb and delivered to Limb a warranty deed.
Obviously, if the Tylers believed that the Smiths claimed any further interest in the
properties, they would not have delivered a warranty deed. The Smiths allege that the Tylers
did not detrimentally rely on their statements claiming no interest in the properties.
However, bare allegations alone are insufficient to withstand a motion for summary
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judgment. See Dwieeins v. Morgan Jewelers. 811 P.2d 182, 183 (Utah 1991) ("Bare
allegations . . . unsupported by facts . . . are insufficient to withstand a motion for summary
judgment.").
Here, the Smiths simply assert that because the Tylers were involved in an initial draft
of the letter sent to the bankruptcy trustee, the Tylers could not have relied upon the Smiths'
statements to the bankruptcy trustee and to the bankruptcy court that the Smiths claimed no
interest in the properties. This argument does not contradict the finding by the district court
that the Tylers relied upon the Smiths' statements. Instead, the Smiths' argument merely
demonstrates that the Tylers were aware of the Smiths' statements and the purported basis
for the Smiths' disclaimer of any interest in the properties-that the Smiths did not possess an
equity of redemption or any other legal right in the properties. Further, the Smiths do not
allege that the Tylers were aware of any possible legal claim that the Smiths could assert to
the properties. In fact, the evidence presented by the Smiths strongly supports rather than
contradicts the district court's finding of reliance. With respect to the statements made in the
bankruptcy proceedings, Perm Smith testified:
Q. And the reason you filed this document, again, was so that the Bankruptcy Court
would release the property from the bankruptcy to the Tylers?
A. That's correct.
Q.
A.
Q.
A.

You wanted the property to be released from the bankruptcy ~
That's correct.
- so Mr. Tyler could sell?
That's correct.

15

[R. 867, 868-69.] This testimony manifests Penn Smith's intention that the Tylers rely on
his statements by selling the properties.
Thus, the undisputed facts are that (i) the Tylers were aware of the Smiths' statements
disclaiming all rights to the properties; (ii) the Tylers took steps to sell the properties; (iii)
the Tylers sold the properties; and (iv) the Tylers delivered a warranty deed to Limb for the
properties. These undisputed facts show detrimental reliance by the Tylers, as the district
court concluded, and the Smiths have failed to present any evidence tending to show that the
Tylers did not rely on the Smiths statements made to the bankruptcy trustee and bankruptcy
court. Consequently, the Tylers possess the right to assert judicial estoppel against the
Smiths.
It is undisputed that Limb is in privity of estate with the Tylers. As a privity with the
Tylers with respect to the properties, Limb is entitled to invoke the doctrine of judicial
estoppel against the Smiths' claims. See Condas v. Condas. 618 P.2d 491, 496 (Utah 1980)
(holding that judicial estoppel "is applicable to defendants here, as successors in interest of
the real property involved in [the] cases"). Therefore, the district court's entry of summary
judgment should be affirmed.
B.

The Undisputed Facts Establish as a Matter of Law that the Smiths' Claim Against
Limb is Barred Because Limb is a Bona Fide Purchaser.
Under Utah law, an unrecorded conveyance is "void as against any subsequent

purchaser of the same property" where the subsequent purchaser "purchased the property in
good faith and for valuable consideration" and his conveyance is recorded first. Utah Code
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Ann. § 57-3-3 (1994). A bona fide purchaser for value entitled to the protection of the
recording act is "one who takes without actual or constructive knowledge of facts sufficient
to put him on notice of the complainant's equity." Blodgett v. Martsch. 590 P.2d 298, 303
(Utah 1978).
The district court found that Limb had no actual knowledge of the Smiths' claimed
interest in the properties prior to his purchase of the properties and recordation of the deeds
conveying title to him. [R. 664; 551, 597.] Additionally, the district court found, based on
undisputed facts, that Limb did not have constructive notice of the Smiths' claimed equity of
redemption prior to the recordation of his deed. [R. 664.] This finding was based in part on
the undisputed fact that Limb's warranty deed was recorded after the bankruptcy trustee's
notice of abandonment. [R. 664.]
On appeal, the Smiths' now attempt to dispute the district court's finding that Limb's
warranty deed was recorded after the notice of abandonment. The Smiths contend that there
is no support for this finding in the record. The Smiths' belated attempt to challenge this
finding should be rejected for two reasons.
First, it is well-established that appellate courts will not consider matters raised for the
first time on appeal. For example, in Zions First Nat'l Bank v. National Am. Title Ins. Co.,
749 P.2d 651 (Utah 1988), the Utah Supreme Court refused to hear the appellant's argument
regarding the existence of an agency relationship, which was raised for the first time on
appeal, even though the facts on the issue were undisputed. Id. at 654. The Utah Court of
Appeals, in State v. Archambeau, 820 P.2d 920 (Utah App. 1991), extensively discussed the
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rule against the consideration of an issue raised for the first time on appeal and the narrow
exceptions to that rule. Id. at 922-26. In Archambeau. the court refused to consider even a
constitutional argument involving the appellant's liberty interest, which was raised for the
first time on appeal, because no "exceptional circumstances" existed nor was "plain error"
apparent.
Under the analysis set forth in Archambeau and other Utah cases, the Smiths' argument
should not be considered. The Statement of Points and Authorities in Support of Limb's
Motion for Summary Judgment listed the dates for the recordation of both the warranty deed
and the notice of abandonment as undisputed facts and stated that the notice of abandonment
was recorded before the warranty deed. [R. 547, 550-51, 554.] The Smiths did not dispute
these facts. [R. 597-607.] Under Rule 4-501(2)(b) of the Utah Rules of Judicial
Administration, these uncontested facts were deemed admitted for the purpose of summary
judgment. Having failed to challenge these facts or raise this point before the trial court, the
Smiths have waived this argument on appeal.
Second, even if this court decides to examine the merits of the Smiths' argument, their
argument is obviously erroneous. The Smiths claim that there is no evidence in the record
regarding when the warranty deed was recorded. Appellants' brief at 25. However, as
demonstrated above, the record contains this information, and the district court expressly
found that the warranty deed was recorded after the notice of abandonment. [R. 664.]3
3

The Request for Abandonment and Notice of Abandonment were recorded at the
Washington County Recorder's office on September 16, 1991 as Entry No. 390753, in Book
618, at Page 79. [R. 549, 577.] Security Title Company closed the sale from Tylers to
18

The Smiths next assert that the district court made a factual finding when it determined
that the only evidence of their allegedly open, visible and exclusive possession of the
property—the loose scrap metal on the vacant land-does not, as a matter of law, constitute
open, visible and exclusive possession sufficient to place a buyer on constructive notice of
the Smiths' asserted interest in the property. This argument fails to appreciate the scope and
operation of summary judgment.
Under Utah law, "actual possession . . . when open, visible and exclusive, will put on
inquiry those acquiring any title to or a lien upon the land so occupied. . . . " Mathis v.
Madsen. 1 Utah 2d 46, 261 P.2d 952, 959 (1953). As the Smiths admit in their brief, the
only evidence of Smiths' alleged possession consisted of only the allegation that there was
some junk, including scrap steel, on the vacant property. Appellants' brief at 22-24. Even
accepting this allegation as true, the district court correctly concluded that "there can be no
genuine issue of fact that scrap steel on vacant land does not constitute open, visible, and
exclusive' possession that could give constructive notice of a claim against title." [R. 665.]
Evidence must rise above a minimum threshold before the evidence, can, as a matter of
law, support a claim. See Chapman v. Primary Children's Hosp.. 784 P.2d 1181, 1186-87
(Utah 1989) (concluding that alleged statement could not, as matter of law, be construed as
fraudulent concealment); see also McNair v. Farris. 944 P.2d 392, 396 (Utah App. 1997)
(discussing requirement that party present evidence sufficient to satisfy threshold of action in
Limb and recorded the Warranty Deed after the bankruptcy notice of abandonment. [R.
550-51, 585-86, 920, 1148.] In fact the Warranty Deed from Tylers to Limb was recorded
on September 16, 1991 as Entry No. 39075, in Book 618, at Page 801.
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order to survive motion for summary judgment). Here, the Smiths failed to produce any
evidence that their alleged possession of the property was open and visible, let alone
exclusive. If such scant evidence of junk on vacant land were legally sufficient to place
prospective purchasers on constructive notice of a claim against title, purchasers could never
be safe in purchasing any vacant land. To avoid the harsh results of being deemed on
constructive notice of a claim against title, prospective purchasers in Utah would be forced to
conduct an exhaustive inventory of all junk or items on the property, thoroughly investigate
the ownership of all such items, and determine whether any owner claims an interest in the
real property. For that specific reason, the Utah Supreme Court has limited the situations
where possession can give constructive notice. Only where the possession is open, visible,
and exclusive can constructive notice arise. Mathis, 261 P.2d at 959. Here, the district
court correctly concluded that the presence of scrap metal on vacant land does not constitute
exclusive possession as a matter of law.
For the reasons state above, Limb is a bona fide purchaser under Utah case law and is
consequently entitled to the protection of Utah Code Ann. § 57-3-3. Accordingly, the
district court correctly entered summary judgment in favor of Limb, and the summary
judgment should therefore be upheld.
C.

The Undisputed Facts Establish as a Matter of Law that the Smiths' Claim Against
Limb is Barred Because the Smiths Abrogated Their Claim of an Equitable Mortgage.
The Smiths' claims to Limb's properties also fail as a matter of law because the alleged

equitable mortgages were abrogated by agreements between the Smiths and the Tylers.
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Even if it is assumed that the absolute warranty deeds given to the Tylers were intended
to be equitable mortgages, it is black letter law that the parties may subsequently abrogate a
conditional mortgage by agreement:
The general rule is that where a mortgage is in the form of a deed absolute or a
conditional sale, the parties may by a subsequent agreement abandon the debt,
cancel the agreement to reconvey, and thus change the character of the transaction
from that of a mortgage to that of an absolute conveyance: and although there is
authority to the contrary, this rule has even been held applicable in the case of a
subsequent parol agreement.
55 Am. Jur. 2d, Mortgages § 520 (1971) (emphasis added). Indeed, it is generally accepted
as the majority rule that a conditional conveyance for security can be converted to an
absolute conveyance by agreement of the parties:
It appears to be generally accepted that the doctrine, "once a mortgage, always a
mortgage," has reference only to agreements entered into contemporaneously with
the execution of the mortgage, and does not prevent the parties from subsequently
entering into agreements which change the character of the instrument....and such
agreements may be made by parol.
Annot., 65 A.L.R. 771 (1960) (emphasis added). The Smiths themselves have acknowledged
at least two separate agreements that abrogated the claimed equitable mortgages.
First, on June 13, 1990, the Smiths and the Tylers entered into a stipulation agreeing to
jointly list the properties for sale. [R. 896.] In this stipulation the Smiths and Tylers agreed
to apply all proceeds from any sale of the properties to the debt owning to the Tylers and, if
any excess money existed after repaying such debt, to distribute the excess proceeds to the
Smiths. [R. 896-97.] The Smiths agreed to surrender all of their remaining interest in the
properties within 21 months of the stipulation if the properties were not sold or if they had
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not fully satisfied their debt to the Tylers. [R. 897.] On July 12, 1990, the bankruptcy
court entered an order approving the stipulation. [R. 898-900.] Judge Eves correctly
concluded that under the stipulation and the order entered by the bankruptcy court, the
Smiths relinquished all right they may have had to the properties themselves, including the
equity of redemption. [R. 666.] The Smiths' only interest related to the properties was to
the overages, if any, obtained from the sale of the properties, fid.]
Second, the Smiths themselves contend that the bankruptcy stipulation was replaced by
an agreement they made with the Tylers on August 19, 1991. Under that agreement, the
Smiths deeded water rights to the Tylers and "agreed to relinquish any claim to the subject
real property in order to facilitate the sale of the property to Tylers' purchaser." [R.
549-50.] According to the Smiths, the Tylers agreed to pay them $40,000. The Tylers, on
the other hand, assert that they agreed only to pay any overage to the Smiths. Although
there may be a factual dispute between the Smiths and the Tylers as to the amount to be paid
by the Tylers to the Smiths, there is no dispute that the Smiths agreed that the property could
be sold free from any claim and that they would be paid some amount by the Tylers. Thus,
the Smiths have admitted that they renounced their interest in Limb's properties.
Though the alleged August 19, 1991 agreement was oral, oral agreements within the
statute of frauds are enforceable to extent that a party acknowledges the existence and terms
of the agreement. See Bentley v. Potter, 694 P.2d 617, 621 (Utah 1984). Here, the Smiths
acknowledge the agreement by alleging both its existence and terms. As shown above, the
agreement, as alleged by the Smiths, extinguished the Smiths' interest in Limb's properties.
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Whether the Tylers have performed their part of the alleged agreement or are liable to the
Smiths for monetary damages is irrelevant to the consideration of whether the Smiths may
once again assert an equity of redemption in Limb's properties.
Based on the existence of these agreements between the Smiths and the Tylers, the
Smiths agreed to abrogate any claim to an equity of redemption in Limb's properties. At
most, the Smiths have had a claim against the Tylers for breach of contract, the monetary
terms of which are disputed between the Smiths and the Tylers. Both agreements
extinguished the Smiths' equity of redemption; therefore, the district court's entry of
summary judgment clearing title to Limb's property was correct and should be affirmed.
D. The Undisputed Facts Establish as a Matter of Law that the Smiths' Claim Against
Limb is Barred by Principles of Equity.
The district court's entry of summary judgment in favor of Limb and against the Smiths
should also be affirmed on the basis that the Smiths' claim is barred on the basis that equity
will not aid those who have done inequity. See generally 27A Am. Jur. 2d Equity §§ 126137 (1996). Though the district court did not rely on this legal theory in granting summary
judgment, Utah courts have clearly established that summary judgment should be affirmed on
any legal basis available to the district court, even if not relied upon by the court in granting
summary judgment. See Alta v. Ben Hame Corp.. 836 P.2d 797, 805-06 (Utah App. 1992).
Courts universally recognize that parties whose conduct has been inequitable should not
be aided by equity. This principle, often referred to as the "clean hands" doctrine, is
summarized by America Jurisprudence Second as follows:
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The frequently stated maxim that "whoever comes into equity must come with
clean hands" is an ancient and favorite precept of the equity court. The principle
announced is recognized as being a fundamental of equity jurisprudence. The same
principle is expressed in the language that whoever has done inequity shall not have
equity.
The equitable doctrine of clean hands expresses the principle that where a
party comes into equity for relief he or she must show that his or her conduct has
been fair, equitable, and honest as to the particular controversy in issue. . . .
27A Am. Jur. 2d Equity § 126 (1996) (footnotes omitted). Utah courts also adhere to this
principle. See, e ^ , Coleman Co. v. Southwest Field Irrig. Co.. 584 P.2d 883, 884 (Utah
1978). As the name "equity of redemption" implies and as the Smiths note in their brief, the
equity of redemption is a creature of equity. Appellants' brief at 14-15. The doctrine of
clean hands, therefore, applies with full force to the Smiths' claim against the title to Limb's
property.
Under the facts of this case, the Smiths are not entitled to receive the equitable benefit
of an equity of redemption on Limb's properties. As noted above, the Smiths have on
multiple occasions expressly disclaimed any and all interest in the properties purchased by
Limb. As a result of these various statements, the properties were released from the Smiths'
bankruptcy, the Tylers agreed to convey the properties by warranty deed, and Limb (an
indisputably innocent party) purchased the properties.
The Smiths' statements related to their bankruptcy proceeding is particularly revealing
of their inequitable conduct. The following excerpts from Perm Smith's deposition expose
his evasive and fraudulent conduct:
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Q. Now, is it correct the reason you were sending this letter to Mr. Gillman [the
bankruptcy trustee] was to convince him to have the properties released out of
the bankruptcy?
A. The purpose I wrote this letter was because we had been converted to a
Chapter 7 involuntarily, and I was trying to get out of the Chapter 7
bankruptcy. And I was trying to get everything I could out of the Chapter 7
bankruptcy, and that's essentially why I wrote the letter. Between what Mr.
Tyler and I discussed he would do if he did send this letter, it fit in with me
trying to get out of the bankruptcy, which I finally succeeded in doing.
Q. Well, did you make any disclosures to the Bankruptcy Court when you filed
this motion to release the properties to the Tylers that you still claimed some
interest in it?
A. I didn't make any disclosure to that effect that I can see.
Q. In fact, you didn't tell the bankruptcy trustee that you still claimed an interest
in the property?
A. I filed a claim of interest in it in the beginning of the bankruptcy.
Q. Right. But then you asked the bankruptcy -A. To release it.
Q. — to release it because you didn't claim an interest anymore?
A. I didn't say I didn't claim an interest in it. I didn't say I did. I didn't say I
didn't.
Q. My question goes to whether you had a claim to the property or not because
this [the Smiths' letter to bankruptcy trustee] says that you had no claim to the
property. And I want to know whether that statement is true or not.
A. I believe I had a claim to the property. I'll have to tell you that. I believe I
had a claim to the property ever since I first borrowed money on the property.
Q. After you sent this letter of February 11, 1991, to Mr. Gillman you never
indicated to the Bankruptcy Court or to Mr. Gillman that you still had a ~
you still made a claim to the property; is that correct?
A. I believe at that time I had already filed to dismiss the petition, and I was
trying all ways I knew, being a pro se litigant and not being lawyer trained, to
get it dismissed out of the bankruptcy, and this is one of the vehicles I was
trying to use.
Q. All right. After you sent Exhibit 15 dated February 11, 1991, to Mr.
Gillman, bankruptcy trustee, and Exhibit 16, the Ex Parte Motion To Release
Real Property, to the Bankruptcy Court, did you notify either Mr. Gillman or
the Bankruptcy Court in any way that you still claim an interest in these
parcels of property?
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A. I don't recall ever doing that.
[R. 1047; 1050-53 (emphasis added).]
These comments reveal the Smiths' extreme self-interested behavior and willingness to
deceive and prevaricate in pursuit of that self interest. As a result of their deceptive
behavior, the Smiths were successful in having the properties released from bankruptcy.
Their deceptions before the bankruptcy court should not be rewarded and aided by the
court's equitable powers. Indeed, it would be inequitable and would sanction an outright
fraud to permit the Smiths to disavow their representations to the bankruptcy court, the
bankruptcy trustee and the Tylers and now claim an interest in the properties to the detriment
of Limb. For these reasons, the Smiths' are not entitled to the aid of equity and their claim
therefore fails as a matter of law.
POINT II
THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN DISMISSING
THE SMITHS' REMAINING CLAIM FOR FAILURE TO PROSECUTE AND
IN DENYING THE MOTION TO SET ASIDE THE FINAL ORDER
A. The District Court Did Not Abuse its Discretion by Dismissing the Smiths' Remaining
Claim for Failure to Prosecute.
A district court's decision to dismiss a case for lack of prosecution will not be
overturned on appeal absent a manifest showing of an abuse of discretion. Hartford Leasing
Corp. v. State. 888 P.2d 694, 697 (Ct. App. 1994), cert, denied, 899 P.2d 1231 (Utah
1995). In other words, the district court's decision must be without support in the record or
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must be a plain abuse of discretion. See Tucker Realty, Inc. v. Nunlev. 16 Utah 2d 97, 100,
396 P.2d 410, 412 (1964). This is a difficult standard to overcome for parties challenging a
decision, particularly where, as here, the record contains abundant evidence supporting the
district court's decision.
The Smiths filed their complaint on October 8, 1992. [R. 1.] After the district court
granted summary judgment in favor of Limb and against the Smiths on May 2, 1995, the
Smiths failed to take further action to prosecute their remaining trial claim. In the meantime,
though the district court had determined that the Smiths possessed no equity of redemption in
Limb's property, the lis pendens filed against Limb's property continued to cloud Limb's
title.
Faced with the Smiths' persistent failure to prosecute their remaining claim against the
Tylers, Limb brought a motion to dismiss for lack of prosecution in order to create a final
appealable order.4 [R. 697-99.] At the September 23, 1996 hearing regarding Limb's
motion to dismiss, the Smiths failed to present justifiable excuses for their failure to
prosecute. The district court, which had the opportunity to observe first-hand the dilatory
prosecution of the case, determined that dismissal was appropriate. Subsequently, the Smiths
moved to set aside the judgment of the district court dismissing their remaining claim. [R.
726-29.] The district court scheduled a hearing on the matter. Once again, however, the

4

In the alternative, Limb requested that the summary judgment order entered in favor of
him be certified as a final judgment under Rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
[R. 697-99.]
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Smiths failed to present any justifiable excuses for their delay. In fact, the Smiths neglected
to even attend the hearing on their motion. [R. 785-86.]
In the face of such consistently inexcusable dilatory conduct, the district court clearly
was within its discretion in dismissing the Smiths' remaining claim. "Such nonaction is
inexcusable, not only from the standpoint of the parties, but also because it constitutes abuse
of the judicial process." Maxfield v. Rushton. 779 P.2d 237, 240-41 (Ct. App.), cert.
denied. 789 P.2d 33 (Utah 1989). The Smiths were presented with "an opportunity to be
heard and to do justice," Westinghouse Elec. Supply Co. v. Paul W. Larsen Contractor,
Inc.. 544 P.2d 876, 879 (Utah 1975), but the Smiths "abused their opportunity through
dilatory conduct." Charlie Brown Constr. Co. v. Leisure Sports Inc.. 740 P.2d 1368, 1370
(Ct. App.), cert, denied. 765 P.2d 1277 (Utah 1987).
On appeal, the Smiths allege that their lengthy delay is excusable because of alleged
settlement negotiations. Many of the Smiths allegations on appeal were not presented to the
district court and made part of the record. Therefore, these allegations are not relevant to
this appeal. To the extent that such allegations were presented to the trial court and made
part of the record, the district court found them to be either not credible or insufficient to
excuse the Smiths' failure to prosecute their claims.
The Smiths' erroneously focus their argument concerning the district court's dismissal
of their remaining claim on whether Limb had standing to argue for the dismissal. Though
this standing argument represents the Smiths' primary challenge to the dismissal, it merits
little in the way of response.
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First, whether Limb had any remaining interest in the case is completely irrelevant to
the district court's decision to dismiss the Smiths' remaining claim. District courts possess
the inherent power to control their dockets. See, e.g.. Power Train Inc. v. Stuver. 550 P.2d
1293, 1294-95 (Utah 1976). Included within this authority is the court's power to dismiss on
its own motion an action for failure to prosecute. In Brasher Motor & Fin. Co. v. Brown.
23 Utah 2d 247, 461 P.2d 464 (1969), the Utah Supreme Court rejected the argument that
dismissal for failure to prosecute may only occur upon the motion of one of the parties
pursuant to Rule 41 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Id. at 464-65. The Court stated:
"In dismissing an action for want of prosecution, the court may proceed under
the statute, or may, of its own motion, take action to that end. In acting on its own
motion, the court must proceed with judicial discretion. Its ruling will not be
disturbed on appeal unless it is manifest from the record that the court's discretion
has been abused."
Id. (quoting Reed v. First Nat'l Bank. 241 P.2d 109 (Or. 1952) (emphasis in original))
(citing Beckman v. Beckman. 401 P.2d 810 (Id. 1965); Harris v. Harris. 196 P.2d 402
(Nev. 1948)) (additional citations omitted); see also Charlie Brown Constr. Co. v. Leisure
Sports Inc.. 740 P.2d 1368, 1370-71 (Ct. App.) (upholding trial court's sua sponte dismissal
of case for lack of prosecution), cert, denied. 765 P.2d 1277 (Utah 1987). Thus, while it
may be true that Limb's motion requesting dismissal brought the Smiths' lack of prosecution
to the court's attention, once the district court was aware of such want of prosecution, the
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district court had the authority to dismiss the Smiths' claim even without a motion before the
court.5
Second, the Smiths' standing argument utterly fails to conduct any analysis as to the
point at which Limb no longer had an interest in the case. The first hearing regarding the
dismissal of the Smiths' claims was held on September 23, 1996. At that hearing, the
district court indicated that it would certify the prior summary judgment in favor of Limb as
final and would dismiss the Smiths' remaining claim for lack of prosecution. The Smiths
suggest that Limb had no remaining interest in the case upon the instant that the district court
stated that it intended to certify the summary judgment as final. This suggestion is clearly
mistaken. Until the district court entered its final order on December 23, 1996, Limb had no
assurance that the summary judgment motion in its favor would be an appealable final
judgment. Without such assurance, Limb was free to make every legal argument supported
by the facts of the case to achieve his goal of finally quieting title to his property. To hold
otherwise would subject Limb to the whims of Smiths in prosecuting their claims, potentially

5

The Smiths' assertion that the district court may not exercise its power to control its
docket without providing more advance notice is without merit. First, the Smiths cannot
claim that they were unaware that their failure to prosecute their claims was an issue because
they were on notice that Limb had moved to dismiss the case for lack of prosecution.
Second, the Smiths presume too much in believing that their willingness to stipulate to
certifying the partial summary judgment as final would somehow cure their failure to
prosecute. See Charlie Brown Constr. Co., 740 P.2d at 1371 ("[A] trial court is not
necessarily bound by a mere stipulation between parties which has not been incorporated in
an order where the stipulation attempts to wrest from the court control of its own calendar."
(citation omitted)). Finally, as discussed above, the Smiths were presented with an
opportunity to convince the district court to set aside its final judgment dismissing their
claims, but the Smiths neglected to attend the hearing on the issue. [R. 782.]
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and actually tying up Limb's ability to convey his property for years. See Hidden Meadows
Dev. Co. v. Mills. 590 P.2d 1244 (Utah 1979). Limb's interests should not be placed
indefinitely in such limbo at the mercy of the Smiths to prosecute their claims to bring the
case to an end.
Third, a careful reading of the district court's final order, dated December 23, 1996,
reveals that the district court did not certify the partial summary judgment as a final
judgment and then dismiss the Smiths' remaining claim. Instead, the court adjudicated all of
the Smiths' claims, either by summary judgment or dismissal for lack of prosecution, and
then, having determined that it had adjudicated all claims in the action, the district court
certified its December 23, 1996 judgment as a final judgment. [R. 730-33.] Though the
Smiths indicated a willingness to stipulate that the partial summary judgment in favor of
Limb be certified as a final judgment, the district court never entered a order pursuant to
Rule 54(b) so certifying the summary judgment, but instead entered the final order
adjudicating all of the Smiths' claims. Thus, the Smiths' standing argument has no basis in
law or in fact and should, therefore, be rejected.
Accordingly, the Smiths have failed to demonstrate that the district court abused its
discretion in dismissing their remaining claim for lack of prosecution. Therefore, the
dismissal should be affirmed.
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B.

The District Court Did Not Abuse its Discretion by Denying the Motion to Set Aside
the Final Order.
A district court's decision regarding a motion for relief from judgment will not be

disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of discretion. Birch v. Birch, 771 P.2d 1114, 1117
(Utah App. 1989). The Smiths' assert that the district court erred by denying their motion,
pursuant to Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, to set aside the court's order
dismissing their remaining claim. However, the Smiths have not provided one iota of
analysis regarding this assertion. Appellees' brief, at 28-31. It is axiomatic that appellate
courts will not consider issues not adequately briefed on appeal. See, e.g., Valcarce v.
Fitzgerald. 331 Utah Adv. Rep. 68 (Dec. 5, 1997). Here, the Smiths have failed to provide
any analysis regarding the district court's refusal to set its order aside. Appellees' brief at
28-31. Consequently, this issue should not be addressed on this appeal. Even if this issue is
considered, the above analysis regarding the district court's entry of the motion to dismiss
and the subsequent history (i.e., the Smiths' failure to attend the hearing regarding their
motion to set aside) amply demonstrates that the district court did not abuse its discretion by
refusing to set aside its order of dismissal. Therefore, the district court's denial of the
Smiths' Rule 60(b) motion should be affirmed.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, Limb respectfully requests that the district court's summary
judgment, dismissal and refusal to set aside its final order be affirmed. No genuine issues of
fact are in controversy and the facts establish that Limb is entitled to judgment as a matter of
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law; therefore, the district court correctly entered summary judgment in iavoi -i Linio.

against the Tylers. Accordingly, the district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing
tl

. t,e district

court's refusal to set aside its final order and Ime. rherefnre. :.--iled 10 sht=w an abuse of
discretion. I'or ihese reasons, the summary juugmeni, wisnns-nii and rclu-^i to set as.Jc i;ie
final order should be affirmed.
DATED this

7-0 '"clay of April, 199S
? -:R \\ \DDOUPS BR OWN (JEE X: I OVEI ESS

Ronald G. "Russell, Esq.
, Kcuwineyp for Defendant Russell J. Limb
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Ronald W. Truman, Esq.
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APPENDIX

•:AL 7TSTRICT COURT FOR WASHINGTON COUNTY
STAT.

F UTAH

PENN HARRIS SMITH,
MARY ANNE SMITH, and
E.P.S. DEVELOPMENT,
a Utah partnership,

MEMORANDUM OPINION and
ORDER GRANTING
DEFENDANT LIMB'S MOTION
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Plaintiffs,
vs.
RICHARD H. TYLER, INA W.
TYLER, and RUSSELL J. LIMB,

Civil N o. 920501015
Judge J. Philip Eves
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that plaiiiLitlo hold an equity r»f

iLipLum in reil-ain

---1

properties purchased by defendant Limb from defendants Russel" H.

Tyler and Ina W. Tyler ("Tylers").

Plaintiffs claim that

warranty deeds by which title to the properties was conveyed to
the Tylers were actually equitable mortgages and that plaintiffs'
equity of redemption arising from those warranty deeds was never
extinguished through foreclosure.
summary judgment on three grounds:

Defendant Limb has moved for
(1) plaintiffs are judicially

estopped from asserting an equity of redemption because of their
specific disclaimer of any interest in the subject properties in
prior bankruptcy proceedings; (2) plaintiffs cannot enforce an
equity of redemption against defendant Limb who was a bona fide
purchaser for value from the Tylers and, therefore, protected by
the Utah Recording Act; and (3) the claimed equitable mortgages
were abrogated by specific agreements between plaintiffs and the
Tylers.
1.

Judicial Estoppel«

Under Utah law, judicial estoppel prevents a party who has
taken a position in prior litigation and has obtained relief on
the basis of it from maintaining the opposite position in another
action,

Condas v. Condas, 618 P.2d 491, 496 (Utah 1980); see

also Hill v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, 829
P.2d 142, 148 n.4 (Utah App. 1992).
In this case, plaintiffs specifically took the position in
their prior bankruptcy case that they claimed no interest in the
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properties so they could be sold and warranted title to the
properties to defendant Limb pursuant to a Warranty Deed-

Tylers

and their successor in title, defendant Limb, would be prejudiced
if plaintiffs are not estopped from disavowing the position taken
in the prior bankruptcy proceedings.
Because defendant Limb is in privity of estate with the
Tylers, having received his title to the subject properties by
way of a deed from the Tylers, defendant Limb is entitled to
invoke the doctrine of judicial estoppel.

See Condas v. Condas,

618 P.2d 491 (Utah 1980) (holding that judicial estoppel "is
applicable to defendants here, as successors in interest of the
real property involved in both cases").
2.

Utah Recording Act.

Under Utah law, an unrecorded conveyance is "void as against
any subsequent purchaser of the same real property" where the
subsequent purchaser "purchased the property in good faith and
for valuable consideration" and his conveyance is recorded first.
Utah Code Ann. § 57-3-3 (1994).

A bona fide purchaser for value

entitled to the protection of the recording act is "one who takes
without actual or constructive knowledge of facts sufficient to
put him on notice of the complainant's equity."
Martsh, 590 P.2d 298, 303 (Utah 1978).
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Plaintiffs argue that constructive notice can also be given
by possession and assert that there are disputed fact issues
regarding plaintiffs7 possession of the properties.

Under Utah

law, "actual possession . . . when open, visible, and exclusive,
will put upon inquiry those acquiring any title to or a lien upon
the land so occupied. . . . "
P.2d 952, 959 (1953).

Mathis v. Madsen. 1 Utah 2d 46, 261

The only evidence of possession submitted

by plaintiffs is the testimony of plaintiff Penn H. Smith that
there were certain items of "junk" including "scrap steel and
things of that nature" on what was otherwise vacant property.
See P. Smith Depo. p. 103. The court concludes that there can be
no genuine issue of fact that scrap steel on vacant land does not
constitute "open, visible, and exclusive" possession that could
give constructive notice of a claim against title.
3.

Abrogation of Equitable Mortgages.

Even if the court were to assume that the absolute warranty
deeds given to the Tylers by plaintiffs were intended to be
equitable mortgages, the parties may subsequently abrogate a
conditional mortgage by agreement.
520, at 508 (1971).

55 Am. Jur. 2d, Mortgages §

Plaintiffs themselves in this case have

alleged at least two separate agreements that abrogated the
claimed equitable mortgages.

First, plaintiffs and the Tylers
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IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant Limb's Motion for
Summary Judgment is hereby granted.

The court will enter a

judgment dismissing the plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint as
against defendant Limb, thereby adjudicating that plaintiffs have
no claim to the subject properties and awarding costs as provided
by law.
DATED this

2731(day

, 1995.

of
BY THE COURT:

JT^Philip Ev«
listrict Court Judge
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hereby certify that on this
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|^ a | | ( j p e | j v e | y

£7k day of

-"-,-? c-r:es of the above and foregoing document, first class

postage pre-paia to •--; uii, .v*. g J. W- • -d the copies in counsel's folder:

Gary W. Pendleton, Esq.
150 North 200 East
Suite #202

Craig S. Dunlap, Esq.
187 North 100 West
St. George, UT 84770

Steven D. Burge, Esq.
P. O. Box 726
Cedar ON, UT M7>> \ 0726

Ronald ~ P. 05
P. O Box r - ! i

r*

4iM

" I

.6 LLC 24 P?\ 3 53
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4U____
Ronald G. Russell, Esq. (A4134)
KIMBALL, PARR, WADDOUPS, BROWN & GEE
Attorneys for Defendant Russell J. Limb
185 South State Street, Suite 1300
Post Office Box 11019
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0019
Telephone: (801)532-7840
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FINAL JUDGMENT

vs.

RICHARD H. TYLER, iNA W l"i IT I1
and RUSSELL J LIMP

Civil No. 920501015
Judge J. Philip Eves

. nits.

This matter came before the court on September 23, 1996 on Defendant Limb's
Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Prosecution or, Alternatively, p- ~ i. • .. ,« Summary
Judgment as Final. Ronald G. Russell anoeared on behalf of Russell J. Limb ("Limb").
Michael B. Hughes appeared on behalf of Richard H. Tyler and Ina W T-- 'er C,nn !ers").
Douglas D. Terry appealed mi In lull' m iin." piiiinlills

PGOS2S

H.IM'II

mi flic n

n

the court having determined to grant said motion, and for good cause appearing,

er,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED as follows:
1. For the reasons set forth in the court's Memorandum Opinions dated April 27,
1995 granting the summary judgment motions of defendants Limb and Tylers, the plaintiffs'
Second Amended Complaint is dismissed in its entirety and with prejudice as against Limb,
and the First and Second Causes of Action in the plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint are
dismissed with prejudice as against Tylers.
2. The court hereby adjudicates and declares that plaintiffs have no right, title,
equity, lien, or interest in the following-described real property located in Washington
County, Utah:
PARCEL 1:
All of Lot 19 of the CANYON BREEZE R.V. RESORT, according
to the Official Plat thereof, recorded in the Office of the County
Recorder of said County.
PARCEL 2:
All of Lot 45 of the CANYON BREEZE R. V. RESORT, according
to the Official Plat thereof, recorded in the Office of the County
Recorder of said County.
PARCEL 3:
Beginning at a point North 89°15'05" East 769.50 feet, along the
Section line from the Northwest Corner of the Northeast Quarter of
the Northwest Quarter of Section 20, Township 42 South, Range 15
West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, and running thence South 00°37'
East, 356.17 feet; thence North 89°23' East 202.37 feet; thence North
00°37' West, 189.02 feet; thence North 51°03'56" West, 262.49 feet
to the point of beginning.
2
00554493
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PARCEL
Beginning at a point North 89°23' East 611.05 feet along the 40 line
and North 00°37' West 260.00 feet from the Southwest Corner of the
Northeast Quarter of the Northwest Quarter of Section 20, Township
42 South, Range 15 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, and running
thence North 00°37* West 438.46 feet; thence South 89°23' West
43.00 feet; thence North 00°37* West 150.0 feet; thence South
38°04'36w West 179.63 feet; thence South 00°36' East 349.82 feet;
thence South 29°25'44" East 114.13 feet; thence North 89°23' East
99.06 feet to the point of beginning.
m

Third Cause "f Action in plaintiffs' Second .Amended Complaint is di^i? ..
.'.-ution.

For the reasons set forth in 'the couit's Order Granting Third-P.trty Defendant
: :U:IL> KU. , , _ L . .

.armiiary Judgitieiil (Lilcd il"VLi\ M !N'i

* * .y

Compiaiai of Tylers is dismissed with prejudice.
^

The court, grants judgment in favor' of Limb and against plamtiffs in the amount

M t iHis of this ;ii lion totalinr $ ^ f / A

<

/O

•

The court, grants judgment in favor of Tylers and against plaintiffs .in, the amr—*

of costs of this i< lion totaling $ "755"- SS
i

7^2

^fC

Tlic ( ourt grants judgment in favor of 'third-party defendant Security T'-'.h

Company and against I j lers in the amount oil i o«;i\ nl this at inm lolaling

-- .>/, ^ ->

^

c

g# xhe court having adjudicated all claims in this action and finding no just reason
for delay hereoy certifies this judgment as a final judgment.
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DATED this ^ ? —day of Oetefeep, 1996.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

ni

I hereby certify that on the
day of October, 1996 a true and correct copy of
the foregoing FINAL JUDGMENT was mailed, postage prepaid, to:
Gary W. Pendleton, Esq.
150 North 200 East, Suite 202
St. George, Utah 84770
Michael D. Hughes, Esq.
Craig S. Dunlap, Esq.
HUGHES & READ
187 North 100 West
St. George, Utah 84770
Thomas M. Higbee, Esq.
Steven D. Burge, Esq.
CHAMBERLAIN & HIGBEE
250 South Main Street
Post Office Box 726
Cedar City, Utah 84720
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